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Assistant Director, R & E

27 August 1948

Chief, Staff Intelligence Group

Scheduling of SR-Series

REFERENCE: a. ORE Administrative Memorandum 40-47  
b. AD/R&E Memorandum for DCI date 12 August 1947

ENCLOSURE: A. SR-Series Production Report

1. Reference a sets forth the basic authorization for the production of situation reports. The list of reports shown on that schedule included the 21 reports requested by Admiral Inglis, to which were added 30 others. With the exception of Latin America, this list was an attempt at providing world-wide coverage.

2. To date, 12 situation reports have been disseminated, excluding an SR on the World Tin Situation. Of this number, 8 were on the Navy list. In addition, 2 are in reproduction, one of which was on the Navy list; 4 have been approved by G/SI for coordination with the IAC. Of these 4, none is on the Navy list.

3. In short, of the reports CIA promised the Navy, 12 remain yet to be done. It is significant that of these 12, the uncompleted Satellite States' reports total 7. (In reference b, para. 2g, ORE assured the Director that "personnel are being assigned the specific task of uninterrupted preparation of reports on the USSR Satellites, which will result in earlier completion of these reports than had been previously scheduled.") Of the remaining 5 reports, two are being combined into one on "Arab States". The delay in bringing out the "Arab States" report can be amply justified by the production performance of B/TSE. Another report, Sweden, has now quite properly been postponed until after the September general elections in Sweden. Regarding the remaining two reports, Siam and Indochina, only preliminary collection of intelligence information has been done.

4. In discussing the future production of the SR-Series with the regional branch chiefs, I find universal agreement on the point that in most cases, time spent on the production of these reports could be used to better advantage if spent on the production of estimates. There is, of course, something to be said for this contention, though there exists a definite point of diminishing returns. In the case of Indonesia, for example, several ORE's would probably be preferable to one SR; in the case of Ecuador, we may well raise the question of whether a need for either ORE's or an SR exists.

5. There are several considerations to bear in mind in reviewing the SR program

a. It would appear inadvisable to fail to produce those reports which were asked for by the Navy, and which CIA promised to produce. This, if for no

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other reason than to preclude a disclosure of an apparent inability to do what was set forth as being within CIA purview and capabilities. But mainly because SR's on the Satellite States are needed.

b. Some countries absent from, or far down the JCS priority listing for the NIS program may be considered proper subjects for SR treatment.

c. SR's covering countries closely associated with the ERF will be well received. (Just get call from OOD in request by ECA, for example.)

d. The SR program has generally been better training for the producing branches and analysts than most branch chiefs are likely to admit.

**6. Recommendations.**

a. That future scheduling of SR's be based on para. 3 of the attached list (Enclosure A).

b. That emergency measures be taken by E/EE to get out two or three SR's on Satellite States.

c. That no fixed policy be adopted regarding revisions, but that revisions be undertaken when circumstances appear to make such revisions desirable (e.g., delay in the production of a given NIS study).

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cc: Chief, Plans and Policy Staff

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